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What are the Limits to
Public Service Advising?
The ‘Public Argument’ Test
Karen Baehler
Some Wellington policy advisers seem to feel under-
employed these days. Although the volume of work is
reportedly high, they complain about being relegated
to implementing policies rather than formulating them.
Where big picture policy is concerned, it is said that
governments mostly develop their ideas outside the
public service’s field of vision, in party caucuses, think
tanks, and prime ministers’ inner circles, or in
consultation with special advisers who report directly
to ministers. Policy advisers are then left to fill in the
blanks. Some imply that things used to be ‘better’ and
that advisers used to exert more leverage over high-level
policy directions.
These concerns are difficult to confirm or deny. The
professional role of ‘policy analyst’ is a fairly new creation
and norms of influence are not yet institutionalised.
Different tasks require different types of engagement,
and different governments develop different
relationships with their advisers. These relationships also
evolve over time. First-term governments often treat
inherited policy advisers with suspicion.  Such suspicions
should fade in a second term as the sitting government
puts its own stamp on the public service, but some habits
die hard, particularly if the public service’s policy advice
capabilities deteriorate during its exile.  In general it is
probably safe to say that public service influence over
high-level policy naturally ebbs and flows, though not
necessarily in predictable cycles.
With a general election ahead, the current crop of
advisers don’t know whether they will be facing a low
tide or high tide of influence.  Either way, it is a good
time to reconsider the normative role of policy advice
in a healthy policymaking system. Is there a role
description that can provide a steady focus for practicing
advisers across the peaks and troughs of the natural
influence cycle, and weave together the many types of
tasks, contexts, and relationships that advisers
encounter?  I can think of no better place to begin
addressing this question than with the work of my
colleague, Robert Gregory, whose critique of rationalism
in policy analysis (i.e., technocracy or rule by expert
elites) has prompted much of my own thinking about
the nature of policy advice. Although I disagree with
much of this critique, I believe that it poses the kinds of
questions that can lead to genuine advances in policy
analysis and advising.
Gregory’s work supplies two cases, discussed below,
which I argue can help us locate the boundaries between
appropriate and inappropriate roles for policy advice in
a healthy democratic polity. Working backward from
these cases, a core principle of good practice emerges,
which is provisionally called public argument advising.
The term ‘argument’ refers here to a coherent set of
propositions that lead from premises to a policy
conclusion.  An argument presents the case for a
particular policy choice, including reasons why the
policy should be favoured.1  A public argument presents
the kind of policy case that citizens will recognise as
legitimate and worthy of discussion, even if they disagree
with the premises and conclusions.  This article reports
on work in progress to develop the idea of public
argument advising and give it practical form. Much
further work needs to be done, and readers are invited
to join in this project and also to critique it.
US policy in Iraq:  Is there a no-
go zone for policy advice?
When searching for external standards of, say, justice or
equity, it is often useful to begin by looking at cases in
which the standards are clearly absent – i.e., cases of injustice
and inequity – and asking why we judge these as we do.
1 Those who would like to explore the general idea of public policy as
a form of argument might begin with  Paris and Reynolds (1983),
Stone (1988), and Majone (1989).
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Applying this principle to the subject of policy advice leads
to the following question: How can we tell when policy
analysis and advice has overstepped its bounds?
Consider first the case of giving policy advice on Iraq to
the Bush Administration.  Gregory (2004) suggests that
Bush Administration analysts working prior to the
invasion would have been wasting their time analysing
policy options and explaining risks, because the decision
to invade Iraq was based on the kind of crude impulses
and covert intentions that do not yield to rational
scrutiny. This was the quintessential case of policy
advisers being told to shut up and implement policy.
What should the policy adviser do in such
circumstances?
The New Zealand Code of Public Service Conduct
answers this question clearly.  Regardless of whether they
expect their advice to be accepted or rejected, public
servants should deliver free and frank advice and then
abide by the government’s policy decisions and
implement them conscientiously. Although the US
setting is different, similar principles would apply.  Policy
advisers who follow this code may find the job
exceedingly unpleasant if they disagree vigorously with
a chosen policy, but they will not be compromising their
professional integrity if they stick with it. Advisers always
have the option of exiting (resigning), with or without
voice (ordinary speaking out or, where necessary, whistle
blowing), if they find the situation intolerable.
Gregory (2004, p.303) argues that something more is
also required of policy advisers in this type of situation.
In the name of relevance, he argues that policy analysis
must be capable of swaying policy makers and carrying
the day politically, which means that it must be able
to engage with ‘the dark recesses of political motivation,
not only where hidden agendas need to be rationalised
by publicly acceptable justifications, but where
ultimate motivation depends far less on logical
reasoning and much more on tacit beliefs and
convictions’ (Gregory 2004, p.302). Thus, analysts
should not only abide by the government’s policy
decisions and implement them, but when formulating
their advice, they should also take into account in some
unexplained way the full array of interests and impulses
that may be driving policy.  In order to be relevant, as
he defines it, policy advice must ‘connect analysis to
the complex, untidy, and usually opaque domain of
political motivation’ (Gregory 2004, p.303).
I look forward to further explanation of these points in
Gregory’s reply to this article, but it appears that a
standard is being set that severely reduces the adviser’s
expected level of detachment from the inner workings
of a government’s psyche.  In practical terms, this means
that advisers are expected to work not only with the
policy rationales that ministers present to them or ask
them to construct, but also to guess at what additional,
unspoken (and sometimes unspeakable) rationales might
possibly motivate a policy choice.
The art of reading ministers’ minds and detecting
subliminal messages is nothing new to experienced
advisers, and it is well understood that many of the best
minister-adviser relationships operate as partnerships in
which the full range of motivations and rationales for
policy may be confidentially explored.  Gregory’s point
is therefore a refreshing one, because it reminds us that
analytical detachment is not always possible or desirable,
and that every policy choice results from the convergence
of multiple reasons and interests around a particular
policy idea.  Making this point in the context of the
Iraq example, however, raises important questions about
an adviser’s obligations to engage with the dark recesses
of political motivation when these are particularly
contemptible.
A helpful distinction in this case is between the kinds
of motivations and policy rationales that do and do not
bear public scrutiny.  In the case of Iraq, the unspeakable
rationales are conveniently obvious.  Some fail the test
of being publicly presentable because they involve
private agendas, such as exacting revenge for old Bush
family grievances or distributing lucrative post-war
reconstruction contracts to business cronies.  Although
access to oil has long been a key factor in the foreign
policies of the US and many other countries (wink, nod),
the goal of gaining control of Iraqi oil does not qualify
as a public rationale for invading Iraq because it violates
the principle that war is a last resort rather than an
ordinary tool of foreign policy.  If any of these hidden
goals were animating Bush Administration decision
makers, they could not have been presented forthrightly
to American citizens without either violating core
principles that the US espouses or distorting them
beyond recognition.
The best of Bush’s defence and foreign policy advisers
under the circumstances would have been aware of these
possible motivations but also kept their distance.  They
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would have focused exclusively on the kinds of
arguments that could be vetted in public. They would
have constructed these arguments, tested them, and
presented their strengths and weaknesses, in the full
knowledge that their advice was unlikely to influence
policy choice but was nonetheless an important part of
the historical record.
What kinds of rationales might pass the public
presentability test in this case? The question is fraught
and the answer depends on enormous assumptions
concerning the morality of war and the degree to which
international law should dictate a country’s public policy
options.  Arguably, public rationales for invading Iraq
might include removing illegal nuclear and chemical
weapons (a rationale supported by international law but
undone by lack of evidence), liberating Iraqis from
oppression, hastening the spread of democratic freedoms
in the Middle East, protecting Israel from its sworn
enemies, demonstrating Anglo-American resolve to
exercise hard power when it is deemed necessary, and
punishing states that sponsor terrorism (referring to
Saddam Hussein’s support of Palestinian terror) in order
to deter such sponsorship in future (e.g., in Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Jordan, and elsewhere). Each member of the
US Congress who voted to finance the war would have
had in mind his or her own preferred combination of
these rationales.  Some opponents of the war disagreed
with these goals, while others supported the goals but
felt that military intervention was the worst possible
way to pursue them. Either way, most participants
valued the opportunity to air the public rationales and
debate them.
Conventional standards of good policy analysis practice
require analysts to construct multiple policy options
and assess these options against multiple goals, but
rarely do the purveyors of conventional good practice
mention the possibility that some goals may lay beyond
the pale of public reasonableness.  The policy adviser’s
role in these cases should not be confused with disdain
for politics, as Gregory suggests. Advisers who refuse
to help justify or pursue hidden agendas that would
fail the public reasonableness test are not shunning
politics, for the focus on public arguments contributes
directly to political positioning. This approach to
circumscribing policy advice is meant to promote
public debate rather than suppress it and to support
open politics over closed.
1980s New Zealand:  when are
analysts too powerful?
The second case is New Zealand’s 1984 policy
revolution, which Gregory (1998) describes as a case
study in technocracy.  As Gregory and other critics tell
the now-familiar tale, the fourth Labour government
allowed a small band of neo-classical economic advisers
to formulate sweeping policy changes that touched all
sectors of the economy and society.  The reforms were
driven through Cabinet and Parliament at top speed
with woefully little public debate, according to critics,
and along the way, the reformers rode roughshod over
the public service’s most valuable asset – trust between
officials, elected representatives, and the people.  The
reformers shunned ordinary knowledge in favour of
technical expertise, and asserted economic theory’s
dominance over democratic process.  Although they
claimed to be led by theory rather than political interests,
Gregory argues that they were engaging in a misleading
and quasi-dishonest form of covert politics.
With respect to the role of policy advisers in this episode,
I respectfully disagree with Gregory and will argue,
contrarily, that the policy advice supplied to the fourth
Labour government was a stellar example of public
argument advising. Elaborate rationales were
constructed linking proposed policy directions to a
particular vision of the long-term public interest.
Although key planks of the resulting policy agenda were
rushed through Parliament in urgency and many
discussions were held behind closed doors, the advice
itself was eminently presentable and, if presented, would
have sparked a healthy, vigorous public debate in almost
any other democratic country with a more heavily
contested political environment and longer experience
with ideas of deregulation, privatisation, and rolling back
the state.  This conclusion holds regardless of whether
one agrees or disagrees with the content of the advice
given at the time.
If 1984 was New Zealand’s first serious encounter with
full-throttle market liberal doctrine, then it should not
come as a surprise that the public debate was a bit thin
at first.  Not only were the natural opponents of market
liberalism understandably ill prepared for this burst of
new ideas, having grown accustomed to a political
system that largely delivered variations on social
democracy rather than alternatives to it, but they were
also taken off guard by the new doctrine’s embodiment
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in a Labour government.  What’s more, the frameworks
and proposals being rolled out in 1984 and beyond were
not the standard, garden-variety form of market
liberalism. They were a complex hybrid of several
different theoretical threads, some of them unfamiliar
in this part of the world; it took time for the academics
and practitioners to sort them out, both locally and
internationally. Add to this the superb political skills of
the people driving the agenda and their ability to wield
the strong executive powers granted by the pre-MMP,
first-past-the-post parliamentary system, and it becomes
considerably harder to fault either the reformers or their
advisers for behaving badly.
Viewed in this way, the general idea of a technocratic
threat seems to lose some of its sting. The unusual
circumstances faced in New Zealand in 1984 are
unlikely to recur, given changes to the electoral system,
and even if they did, Gregory argues that highly
theoretical policy advice usually fails to move policy
makers because it cannot speak to their political
imperatives (Gregory 2004, 2002).  New Zealand under
the fourth Labour government is the exception that
proves that rule.
Contrary to what its rationalist critics say, the practice
of policy advice in New Zealand in the revolutionary
period fits squarely within the boundaries of appropriate
policy advice, understood within a public argument
framework.  Whatever one thinks about the wisdom of
Treasury’s advice to the fourth Labour government, it
cannot be said that the policies were rigged to serve
private motivations or hidden agendas.  Just like any
other ideologically and theoretically coherent set of
policy proposals, their purpose was to give effect to a
particular view of government’s role in the economy
and society.  Toward that end, they employed the tried
and true rhetorical method of asserting the absolute
superiority of their approach (‘there is no alternative’).
Had the reformers been arguing the absolute superiority
of a different body of doctrine - whether social capital
theory, feminist theory, Keynesian economics,
Methodist Socialism, post-positivism, liberation
theology, or whatever you like – the sources and content
of the criticism may have been altogether different.
This policymaking episode also helps to identify an
important feature of good practice advice.  The advisers
to the fourth Labour government drew from several
streams of theory to build their policy architecture, and
this no doubt has contributed to the remarkable
durability, or hybrid vigour, of its basic elements. Had
the election of 1990 gone differently, yet more streams
of thinking could have been incorporated, including
perhaps a more social democratic approach to social
policy, which, combined with the economic and state
sector reforms, would have constituted New Zealand’s
unique brand of third-way governance.
Critics who worry about ideological narrowness among
policy advisers would do well to encourage broad exposure
of public servants to a spectrum of theories, policy ideas,
and worldviews, rather than arguing against theory-based
policy formulation on technocratic grounds. This does
not mean that every policy paper should contain a full
array of ideologically tailored options from the political
left to the right.  Most ministers would not tolerate such
a practice for a moment. Over time, however, policy
advisers can and should be expected to develop and keep
up to date their own cognitive maps of their policy field,
including both basic descriptive data about the relevant
phenomena (whether clients or environmental patterns
or economic indicators) and some sort of multi-
dimensional chart that locates competing policy
approaches in ideological space.
Armed with such a virtual map, advisers would be able
to break out of the usual ideological stereotypes, place
the government of the day’s policy preferences in a larger
context, combine smart practices across political brands,
search for solutions suggested by the descriptive data,
avoid capture by policy fads, and reduce the problem of
policy whiplash (see box p. 9).
What is good practice in public
argument advising?
Before the idea of distinguishing public from non-public
policy rationales can become a useful guide for practice,
criteria for making these judgments are sorely needed.
The basic concept derives from philosophy’s liberal
restraint principle, which holds that citizens (including
officials) who propose policies that involve coercion of
their fellow citizens ought to restrain from using non-
public reasons to support those proposals, out of respect
for each other and the democratic system.  Public reasons
are understood as the kinds of reasons that other
reasonable people might accept as reasonable without
necessarily having to agree with them.  The distinction
between toleration and agreement looms large here.  In
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a system that values toleration, citizens should be able
to accept a reasonable policy argument or rationale as
worthy of democratic consideration and public debate
while also disagreeing with it.
This formulation of the liberal restraint principle still
leaves much to the imagination, however: What is a
reasonable person?  What might she reasonably accept
as a tolerable argument?  What about groups in society,
such as religious fundamentalists, who reject the liberal
restraint principle altogether? Philosophers have debated
these points vigorously, and notions of what qualifies as
a public reason will vary from society to society and age
to age.  A lot of work is needed to translate the abstract
principle of liberal restraint into practice.
At a common sense level, the public argument approach
simply requires analysts to ask themselves:  What can I
honestly and unashamedly say to my fellow citizens
about the merits of this policy?  Am I asking my fellow
citizens to suspend either their core values or their
common sense in order to support this policy?  Beyond
these deceptively simple questions, the job of
recognising, building, testing, repairing, and refining
public arguments for policy requires a sophisticated mix
of skills, methods, and sensitivities. It requires
confidence and clarity about the adviser’s place within
the larger policymaking process as well as finely tuned
ethical radar.  I agree with Gregory (2004, p.311) that
policy advisers should be people ‘who embrace political
interaction; and who are both comfortable and effective
in complex, conflict-ridden, uncertain, and
transformational policymaking contexts,’ but they also
need to recognise the kinds of situations in which they
ought to feel uncomfortable, as when they are expected
to participate actively in non-public policy and politics.
A good practice agenda going forward could focus on
developing the following features of a public argument
model for policy advice:
• Establishing clearer principles and rules of thumb
for distinguishing public and non-public policy
rationales.
• Scanning the ideological and evidence terrain and
building cognitive maps of a policy field, as described
in the previous section.
• Developing better methods for building and testing
arguments. For example, intervention-logic-type and
results-chain-type methods can be used to describe
the arguments behind particular policy instruments,
including both high-level rationales (which sit at the
top of the chain linking policy to big-picture goals)
and lower level delivery plans (which sat at the
bottom of the chain and focus on implementation
imperatives and risks) (Baehler 2001, 2003).
• Using evidence to build and support the argument
framework.  Note, here, that evidence is not the basis
of policy.  It is one ingredient in the overall argument,
which consists of evidence linked with logic linked
with an appeal to people’s values and emotional
commitments.
• Engaging ministers in the shared goal of building
good public arguments.  Policy advisers must give
expression to ideas and aspirations that are often
inchoate and complex. To do so requires both a good,
collaborative relationship with the minister so that
the minister’s ideas can be drawn out and developed,
and an eloquent tongue (pen) for articulating the
ideas honestly, accurately and in ways that will help
build political coalitions and win public support.
In particular, advisers need to be able to engage
ministers in crafting the outcome statements that
sit at the top of results chains.
Conclusion
The most significant contribution that policy advisers
can make to policymaking is to focus intently on the
job of tending a broad range of public arguments and
thereby feeding the connective tissue of political
association. This role description, though simple in
principle, seems rich enough to provide a steady focus
for good practice across the ups and downs of ministerial
demand, continuity across different types of tasks and
relationships, guideposts when ethical dilemmas arise,
and a bulwark against the pressures for advisers to
become either political hacks or pointy-headed evidence
purists. Thus, the idea of public arguments for policy
provides not only a bridge between political and policy
logic, but also an architectural structure for
understanding the role of policy advisers within the
political and policymaking system.
This article both argues with and expands upon Bob
Gregory’s critique of rationalist policy analysis in order
to begin sketching how an alternative approach to good
practice might emerge. Considerable further work is
needed to develop this approach, and the few broad
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strokes presented here are meant to stimulate comment
and draw others into the enterprise.  They are meant to
focus attention again on the question: What, then,
should the policy adviser do?
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